#STACYGATE

Filing # 216747384 E-Filed 02/13/2025 04:31:10 PM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

S.C. No. To be assigned

DCA No. ██████████████

Lower Case No. ██████████████

ROBERT A. DAVIS,

Petitioner/Father,

vs.

██████████████████,

Respondent/Mother,

and

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Respondent.

______________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ROBERT A. DAVIS, pro se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a Writ of Mandamus, asserting that Seminole County Judge Susan Stacy failed to perform clear legal duties under Florida law. Although the case is now under the jurisdiction of Honorable Judge Mark E. Herr, this Petition seeks to address and rectify the procedural and substantive errors previously made by Judge Stacy that Manifest Injustice, Civil Rights violations, and denies Due process. As grounds therefor, Petitioner states:

I. INTRODUCTION

1.     Petitioner seeks an extraordinary remedy to address a child support order issued by Seminole County Judge Susan Stacy. The order not only violates clear legal requirements and inflicts ongoing financial harm but also reflects a blatant gender bias that directly raises deprivation of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Constitutional Rights, and Due Process concerns.

2.     The Petitioner has no other adequate legal remedy and meets the criteria for mandamus established in Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2002) and Plymel v. Moore, 770 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The prejudice caused by this order continues unabated, leaving Petitioner with no recourse but to seek extraordinary relief.

3.     As a tax-paying citizen and resident of Florida, The Petitioner’s rights and interests are significantly harmed by these clear statutory violations. This harm is compounded by evident gender bias, further solidifying Petitioner’s standing to seek relief in this Court.

II. JURISDICTION

4.     This Court possesses jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus under Article V, Section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(a), Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(e), which collectively empower the Court to compel public officers and agencies to perform duties required by law when a clear legal right to such performance has been established.

5.     Accordingly, this Petition is properly before this Court, and the requested relief falls squarely within its jurisdiction.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE APRIL 25, 2023 HEARING

6.     On May 7, 2021, the Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Paternity (App. 14–16) in Seminole County, Florida.

7.     On September 21, 2021, the parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement (App. 17–38) providing for a 50/50 timesharing schedule.

8.     On October 6, 2021, the Petitioner timely moved to set aside and/or amend the mediated settlement agreement(App. 39–52), alleging fraud and requesting a finding of perjury against the Mother.

9.     No order was issued or signed by the court regarding the mediated settlement agreement, and litigation continued without a finalized resolution to the parties’ initial stipulations.

10. On July 18, 2022, Judge Susan Stacy acknowledged that the Petitioner had agreed to cover 100% of the minor child’s daycare and medical insurance expenses as captured in the Court’s minutes (App. 53–59).

11.At this time, the mediated settlement agreement was split into two parts (Paternity and child support) as the court ruled and established paternity and further set the child support portion for trial(App. 58–59).

12.On February 23, 2023, both parties stipulated that the Mother would pay $150 per month in temporary child support, noting that the Petitioner was already paying the daycare and medical insurance costs (App. 60–61).

13.The child support matter was then set for in-person hearings on April 25, 2023, before Judge Susan Stacy, for a final determination of both ongoing and retroactive child support.

14.Pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285(k), the Petitioner previously filed the Child support worksheet reflecting the correct on file incomes of both parties and current child expenses (App. 62–73). The Petitioner also filed them as exhibits for use at the upcoming hearing (App. 74-116).

B. THE APRIL 25, 2023 HEARING

15. On April 25, 2023, the court held an in-person hearing before Judge Susan Stacy to address ongoing and retroactive child support issues in the paternity action. Both parties appeared, and the Petitioner (father) presented updated child support worksheets as an exhibit, reflecting calculations based on his covering the child’s daycare and medical insurance costs in full.

16. At the outset of the hearing, the Petitioner’s calculations indicated that the Respondent (mother) would owe him approximately $170.37 in monthly child support (App. 76-79). According to the Petitioner, this figure factored in his payment of “100% of daycare and 100% of medical insurance expenses.”

17. Shortly after these figures were discussed, Judge Susan Stacy expressed hesitation about ordering the mother to pay final ongoing child support. The Petitioner recalls the Judge asking, “Are you trying to place the mother on child support?”. The Judge’s remarks reflected a concern about imposing a support obligation on the mother under the circumstances presented.

18. The court then examined the parties’ arrangements concerning health insurance. The Respondent’s then Attorney[Nina Oswald] observed that, under a 2021 stipulation, the mother was supposedly responsible for carrying commercial insurance on the child; however, the mother had no such coverage at the time of the hearing (App 318).

19.Despite this, Judge Susan Stacy denied the Petitioner’s medical insurance credits, stating the Mother was solely responsible (App 118), thereby reducing the amount the mother would otherwise have owed. This action was solely done to block the Father from getting credit for his insurance. As previously mentioned, the child support portion of the mediated settlement agreement was never made to order and was the sole purpose of the hearing that day.

20. In response to the denial of these credits, the Petitioner recalculated the child support obligation and the Respondent (Mother) was still due to owe support. This adjusted amount still assumed that the Petitioner would be 100% responsible for all daycare expenses while receiving no credit for his ongoing insurance payments.

21. Following further discussion, the Judge revisited daycare expenses. Rather than continuing the prior arrangement, under which the Petitioner paid 100% of daycare costs, the court ordered a “pro-rata” division of those expenses (App. 9, ¶ 3), stating, "On an ongoing basis, the parties shall be responsible for their pro-rata share of the child support costs directly to the childcare provider" (App. 9, ¶ 3). This represented a shift from the Petitioner’s complete coverage of daycare to a shared percentage between both parents.

22. The updated pro-rata calculation ultimately reversed the expected obligation. Instead of the mother paying child support to the Petitioner, the final worksheet used during the hearing showed the Petitioner owing $52.05 per month to the Mother (App. 315-318). Although the court referenced a child support worksheet when making this determination, no revised worksheet reflecting this outcome was formally filed.

23. By the conclusion of the April 25 proceeding, Judge Susan Stacy had denied the Petitioner’s medical insurance credits and altered the daycare cost allocation(Pro Rata), resulting in a finding that required the Petitioner to pay ongoing child support to the mother rather than the mother owing support to him.

24.Due to time restrictions, the arrears matter was set for April 27, 2023.

C. THE APRIL 27, 2023 HEARING

25.On April 27, 2023, the father appeared before the court with updated financial affidavits that he had prepared in response to the court’s prior ruling on April 25, 2023(App119-130). The updated affidavits were intended to reflect Judge Susan Stacy’s decision disallowing Medical insurance credits the Father had previously claimed.

26.At the outset of the hearing, the Father made a brief opening statement. Referring to the proceedings two days earlier, he said, “During my time here with you on Tuesday, you made very great points about things being amicable to both parties... During that time, you made note...the mother’s mental state being soured...if she was placed on child support...What I would like to make clear today is that ██████ resides at both of our residences equal amounts, and the mother and I both deserve clear mental state and clear mental stability.” The court responded simply, “Okay. Thank you.”. (App 140-141)

27. No objections or further commentary followed the opening testimony. Although such remarks would typically prompt a response if the referenced events were unclear, no one spoke up because the events from two days prior were visibly evident to all present. This unspoken understanding confirmed that nothing in the testimony was perceived as controversial.

28.After his opening remarks, and later in the hearing, the father attempted to introduce the updated financial affidavits into evidence. He explained on the record that these revised figures were relevant not only to his ongoing obligations but also to calculations dating back to June 2022. Opposing counsel objected, asserting that the father’s net income had already been established at the previous hearing.

29.The court sustained the objection and refused to admit the updated affidavits. In response, the Father sought clarification, reiterating that the newly calculated amounts addressed retroactive child support dating back to June 2022. Despite this explanation, the court maintained its ruling(App 230 -235).

30.Following the court’s ruling, the Father concluded his argument, noting that he had been prevented from using the revised figures and thus would be unable to reflect the disallowed medical credits in either current or retroactive support calculations.

31.Turning to the Mother’s income, the court relied on the adjusted gross income(AGI) reported on her 2022 tax return for purposes of retroactive support(App 247-248). The court used the amount shown on line 9 of the IRS Form 1040(App 255), which included deductions that were not specifically recognized for child-support calculations under Florida Statute § 61.30.

32.The father objected to using the mother’s adjusted gross income “averages” in lieu of her on-file, and present financial affidavit (App 323-328). He argued that the affidavits provided a more precise monthly net figure. Nevertheless, the court proceeded with the tax-return-based calculation, arriving at a monthly figure lower than what the mother had stated in her financial affidavit.

33.As a result of the court’s decisions, the father’s child-support obligations and any associated arrearages were calculated by combining his net income from his own affidavit with the mother’s lower figure from her adjusted gross income thus inflating the arrears amount (App 247-250). The hearing concluded on April 27, 2023, without further opportunity for the father to revise or supplement the record regarding the denied medical credits and inflated arrears.

D. EVENTS AFTER THE APRIL 27, 2023 HEARING

34.On August 8, 2023, the court entered a Partial Final Judgment on Child Support (App 9–13). This order memorialized the rulings made during the hearings on April 25, 2023 and April 27, 2023, including the final child-support calculations that required the Father to pay child support to the Mother.

35.Following the Partial Final Judgment, the Father filed a motion for rehearing(App 276-283), contending that the court had not adequately addressed the applicable statutory guidelines and did not include sufficiently detailed findings. Judge Susan Stacy denied this motion without holding a hearing(App 284-288).

36.On September 6, 2023, the Father filed a notice of appeal (App 289-295). The appellate court issued a per curiam affirmance on August 6, 2024(App 296-297), without a written opinion. The Father moved for rehearing and for a written opinion, but both requests were denied on September 13, 2024.

37.On October 8, 2024, the Father moved to recall the appellate mandate, arguing that manifest injustice and constitutional violations had occurred. The appellate court denied this request without further addressing the asserted statutory or constitutional issues.

38.The father again sought additional review, but all subsequent motions were denied. the final denial was issued on November 25, 2024, titled “Order on motion to certify; Mot certification/rehearing/written opinion denied,” thus concluding the appellate proceedings(App 314).

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

1. DENIAL OF MEDICAL CREDITS

1.a Clear Legal Right

39.Under Florida Statute 61.30(8), health insurance costs ordered pursuant to section 61.13(1)(b) “shall be added to the basic obligation,” and any moneys prepaid by a parent for such costs “shall be deducted from that parent’s child support obligation.” The statute’s use of “shall” leaves no discretion to deny or reduce properly substantiated credits. See Ledger v. City of St. Petersburg, 135 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Trapeo, 136 So. 3d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).

40.The parties’ original 2021 settlement contemplated the Mother carrying commercial insurance, but that arrangement never became a court order(see paragraphs 2–6 of the Statement of Facts). Subsequent orders placed responsibility on the Father (App60-61) to provide health coverage, which he did without interruption.

41.During the April 25, 2023 hearing (see paragraphs 12–14 of the Statement of Facts), the Judge relied on the unused 2021 stipulation to deny the Father’s request for credits, even though the Mother had no active insurance(App 318). This denial contradicted section 61.30(8) because the Father was, in fact, the only parent providing coverage.

42.The Partial Final Judgment issued on August 8, 2023 memorialized these rulings. As reflected in the order (App 9–13), the Father received only limited recognition of the premiums he had actually paid, despite the statutory requirement that all such amounts “shall” be deducted from his support obligation.

43.Florida courts have repeatedly affirmed that when a statute uses “shall,” the trial court must apply it as written. See State v. Goode, 779 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Neal v. Bryant, 149 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1962).

44.By failing to fully credit the Father, thus denying his medical insurance, Judge Susan Stacy violated the plain, ministerial duty imposed by section 61.30(8), thereby denying his clear legal right to offset insurance costs. This denial contravened established law that "shall be followed without judicial discretion" (Solomon v. Sanitarians’ Registration Bd., 147 So. 2d 132 [Fla. 1962]).

45. Judge Susan Stacy effectively refused this statutory right despite the Mother having no commercial coverage(App 318) and the court previously ordering the Father to maintain insurance(App 60-61). Without any factual or legal basis to disregard his statutory credits, the Father improperly faced an increased child support obligation in violation of section 61.30(8).

46. The refusal to apply the Petitioner’s medical insurance credits directly contradicts the mandatory language of Fla. Stat. § 61.30(8), and under St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 971 (Fla. 2000), courts must apply statutes as written without imposing judicially created exceptions that alter the Legislature’s intent.

47.The undisputed record reflects that the Father prepaid insurance costs as required. No additional fact-finding was necessary, and the trial court lacked discretion to disregard the statutory mandate.

1.b Clear Duty

48. Section 61.30(8), Florida Statutes, unambiguously provides that once a parent has prepaid the child’s health insurance costs, those amounts “shall be deducted” from that parent’s support obligation. The statute sets no further prerequisites; its plain text confers a non-discretionary command that must be followed the moment prepaid coverage is established.

49.The Court must “begin with the ‘actual language used in the statute’” because legislative intent is determined first and foremost from the statute’s text. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Borden v. E. European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006)). In applying this principle to section 61.30(8), the statute’s mandatory language (“shall”) does not permit a judge to ignore or deny documented prepaid medical insurance credits for child support.

50. As recognized in Ledger v. City of St. Petersburg, 135 So. 3d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), when a statute uses “shall,” the court’s duty to comply is purely ministerial. Likewise, Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Trapeo, 136 So. 3d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), holds that “shall” leaves “no room for discretion” and obligates the court to perform the specified act without further fact-finding or exception.

51. Accordingly, having shown that health insurance payments were indeed prepaid, the Petitioner possesses an unequivocal right to have those amounts deducted under section 61.30(8). The trial court cannot lawfully deny or limit these credits; the statutory language admits no discretion.

2. DECLINED TO INCLUDE CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEETS

2.a Clear Legal Right

52.The Father timely filed a valid Child Support Guidelines Worksheet on January 10, 2023(App 62-73). Nevertheless, the worksheet currently used to enforce the current child support obligation were never formally filed with the court or made part of the official record. The Final Order also references worksheet exhibits that were never formally filed. This omission prevented the Petitioner from obtaining a thorough appellate review of the underlying calculations.

53.Pursuant to Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285(k), whenever child support is established or modified, the court must ensure that a Child Support Guidelines Worksheet is filed and made part of the record on or before the relevant hearing. This requirement is not subject to waiver, and it is mandatory for both parties.

54.Florida courts have consistently held that the failure to file, include, or attach a Child Support Guidelines Worksheet in the record constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., R.M. v. R.C., 227 So. 3d 160, 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Hogan v. Aloia, 257 So. 3d 479, 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). Most recently, in Stellato v. Stellato, 386 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024), the Fourth District reaffirmed that while a worksheet need not be physically attached to the final judgment, it must either be filed simultaneously or reference a properly filed worksheet, citing Nepola v. Nepola, 373 So. 3d 642, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

55.Judge Susan Stacy’s failure to file or reference a properly filed Child Support Guidelines Worksheet here violated Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285(k) and deprived the Petitioner of a critical tool for proper appellate review, thereby infringing upon the Father’s clear legal right to have that worksheet included in the final order.

56.The omission of the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet is an undisputed procedural defect. This issue does not require additional fact-finding, as the record confirms that no properly filed worksheet was included

2.b Clear Duty

57. The plain language of Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.285(k) creates a clear, non-discretionary duty for the presiding Judge to receive and include the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet when establishing or modifying child support.

58. Where a statute or rule uses mandatory language such as “must,” the court has no discretion to disregard compliance. Rule 12.285(k) unequivocally states that “[t]his requirement cannot be waived by the parties.” Failure to incorporate the worksheet is therefore contrary to the explicit duty imposed on the court.

59. By ignoring the child support worksheet the father submitted, and by not filing a new or updated worksheet with the final child support order, the trial court failed to fulfill its clear duty under Florida law. As established in R.M. v. R.C. and Hogan v. Aloia, the court’s obligation is both well defined and mandatory.

60.Because Rule 12.285(k) imposes a clear legal duty that was not followed, and because no alternative remedy exists to correct this omission, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to file or reference a proper Child Support Guidelines Worksheet.

3. DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

3.a Clear Legal Right

61.Courts have long recognized that a denial of due process warrants mandamus relief.See Plymel v. Moore, 770 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

62.A fundamental tenet of due process is a fair and impartial tribunal. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).

63.As Marshall explains, "The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process: the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process. The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done,’ by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him." 446 U.S. at 242 (internal citations omitted).

64.At the April 25, 2023 hearing, the Father, who had been paying 100% of daycare and medical insurance expenses, was unexpectedly placed on ongoing child support.

65.Despite presenting worksheets demonstrating that the Mother owed him support based on those expenses(App 75-78), Judge Susan Stacy, without prior notice, denied his medical insurance credits(App 118) and ordered a division of daycare costs (App. 9, ¶ 3), stating, "On an ongoing basis, the parties shall be responsible for their pro-rata share of the child support costs directly to the childcare provider" (App. 9, ¶ 3).This abrupt change departed from the established responsibilities and left the Father blindsided by new obligations.

66. This sudden shift mirrors the due process violation in Buschor v. Buschor, 248 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), where relief was improperly granted without prior notice. As a result, the Father was deprived of the opportunity to address or refute these modifications. Furthermore, as stated in Segall v. Segall, 708 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), “a failure to consider all of the mandated factors is reversible error.” In this case, the judge reversed a superseding order(60-61) that had made the Father solely responsible for medical insurance, thereby shifting the obligation to the Mother, who had no commercial insurance(App 318), thus blocking the Father from utilizing his existing coverage.

67.Subsequently, the court imposed a split daycare arrangement (App. 9, ¶ 3) even though the prior order required the Father to pay 100% of the daycare costs. Neither the court minutes (App 117-118, 131-134) nor the final order(App 9-13) provided any explanation or competent, substantial evidence to justify this departure from established responsibilities. This omission aligns with the holding in Parenteau v. Parenteau, 795 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), which establishes that “failure to make the specific findings requires reversal.”

68.In preparation for the April 27, 2023 hearing, the Father updated his financial affidavits(App 119-130) to reflect the court’s denial of his medical insurance credits, an action permitted under Florida Statute § 61.30(3)(e), given that he had been paying these premiums through payroll deductions. If Judge Susan Stacy would not allow those credits, the Father was justified in subtracting them from his net income.

69.At the April 27 hearing, the Father opened by referencing the Judge’s prior remark that the Mother’s “mental state” would be negatively affected if she were placed on child support . He noted both parties share equal timesharing and deserve equal consideration. Neither the Judge nor opposing counsel disputed this account(App 140-141).

70.The Father then attempted to introduce his updated financial affidavits into evidence, explaining that the revisions addressed not only his current obligations but also retroactive support calculations dating back to June 2022. Opposing counsel objected, arguing the Father’s net income had already been “established” at the previous hearing.

71.The court sustained the objection and excluded the updated affidavits, preventing the Father from deducting the disallowed medical insurance amounts for either ongoing or retroactive calculations.

72.Although the Father clarified that these figures were essential for determining arrearages, the court reiterated its decision to exclude them(App 230 -235).

73.The Father updated his financial affidavits in direct response to Judge Susan Stacy’s ruling just two days prior denying his Medical insurance credits, a ruling that directly impacted his net income calculation ongoing and previous. This was not arbitrary or opportunistic; it was a clear and transparent cause-and-effect action grounded in statutory guidelines.

74.Under Vollmer v. Key Devt. Prop., 966 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), litigants have the right to “introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” and denial of that right constitutes a due process violation. (quoting Baron v. Baron, 941 So.2d 1233, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). By excluding the updated affidavits, the court impaired the Father’s ability to present critical information.

75.Next, the court calculated the Mother’s retroactive child-support obligation using her adjusted gross income (AGI) from her 2022 tax return(App 255-275), $█████, or $█████ per month. This figure reflected deductions not recognized under Florida Statute § 61.30. However, her financial affidavit, filed months prior(December 2021) and presented as exhibits that day, showed a monthly net income of $█████(App 324).

76.Despite the Father’s objection that relying on “averages” from an AGI improperly lowered the Mother’s income, the court proceeded to adopt the Father’s net income from his own affidavit while using the Mother’s reduced AGI-based figure for hers. This created an imbalance that increased the Father’s retroactive child support obligation.

77.On August 8, 2023, the court entered a Partial Final Judgment on Child Support (App. 9-13) memorializing the decisions from April 25 and April 27 and listing the Mother’s monthly income even lower at █████(App. 10, ¶ 11). The Father filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the court failed to apply statutory guidelines or make sufficient findings (App. 276-283). The court denied that motion without a hearing(App. 284-288).

78.The appearance of irregularity in these proceedings calls into question the fairness of the outcome. See Scull v. State, 569 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990). Florida courts have emphasized that ensuring “the appearance and reality of fairness” is essential to due process. See Lee v. State, 264 So. 3d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).

79.When a litigant is deprived of an impartial forum or denied the chance to present material evidence, it constitutes fundamental error undermining the very foundation of due process. See Scoggins v. State, 691 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Jenkins v. State, 824 So. 2d 977, 981-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).

80.In reviewing discretionary rulings, courts apply a “reasonableness” test that recognizes the trial court’s vantage point. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). Here, however, by excluding essential evidence of the Father’s updated net income, and simultaneously denying his medical insurance credits, and using a minimized figure for the Mother’s income, Judge Susan Stacy unreasonably compromised the Father’s Due process rights.

81.The Father thus has a clear legal right to a fair trial, free from gender bias, erroneous evidentiary exclusions, and partiality in calculating child support obligations. Mandamus relief is warranted to correct the denial of due process and to restore fundamental fairness in these proceedings.

82.Accordingly, this Court should grant the writ and compel the trial court to honor the Father’s right to an impartial adjudication under controlling statutory and constitutional principles.

3.b Clear Duty

83. A judge’s obligation to ensure due process and maintain a fair, impartial tribunal is absolute. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal…”); Plymel v. Moore, 770 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a denial of due process justifies mandamus relief).

84. In this case, the Father was unexpectedly placed on child support at the April 25, 2023 hearing despite paying 100% of the minor child’s daycare and medical insurance expenses at the start of the hearing and thereafter. When he returned on April 27, 2023 with updated financial affidavits, addressing the denial of medical credits allowed under Florida Statute § 61.30(3)(e), Judge Susan Stacy refused to admit them, depriving him of the chance to correct both his net income and retroactive calculations. This denial contravenes the litigant’s right to present material evidence “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Vollmer v. Key Devt. Prop., 966 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

85. The court then used the Mother’s adjusted gross income from her tax return, which contained deductions not recognized by § 61.30, while simultaneously applying the Father’s higher net income from his affidavit. This produced a distorted calculation that increased his arrears obligations, undermining the appearance of neutrality. As Scull v. State, 569 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 1990) and Lee v. State, 264 So. 3d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) make clear, such irregularities erode confidence in the fairness of the proceedings and violate due process.

86. Henry v. Henry, 191 So. 3d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) held that miscalculation of parties’ incomes required remand for recalculation of child support. Awards of retroactive child support are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Wright v. Wright, 411 So.2d 1334, 1336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

87. These cumulative errors, unexpectedly imposing support, disallowing updated affidavits, and combining inflated numbers for the Father with a reduced figure for the Mother, strike at the core of a fair hearing and constitute fundamental error. See Scoggins v. State, 691 So. 2d 1185, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Jenkins v. State, 824 So. 2d 977, 981–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Although trial courts have discretion, it must remain within the bounds of reasonableness, Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980). By failing this clear duty to ensure impartiality, the court’s rulings deprived the Father of his constitutional and statutory rights, warranting mandamus relief.

SIMPLIFIED REASONABLENESS TEST

88.To further illustrate the clear gender bias, unfair, and unreasonable nature of this case, the below shows the following illustration of events, removing gender and referring to the parties as Person A and Person B:

1. Person A files a Petition to Establish Paternity on May 7, 2021.

2. Person A and Person B enter into a mediated settlement agreement and begin 50/50 custody.

3. On October 6, 2021, Person A moved to set aside or amend the entire mediated settlement agreement, which the agreement was never made into an order, and the parties continue litigationand 50/50 custody.

4. On July 18, 2022, Person A agrees to cover 100% of the child’s daycare and medical insurance.

5. On February 23, 2023, both parties stipulate that Person B will pay $150 monthly in temporary support, acknowledging Person A’s continued ongoing daycare and insurance payments, and a Judge affirms this by order.

6. On April 25, 2023, the Judge denies Person A’s Medical insurance by citing an unordered 2021 agreement (even though Person B has no commercial insurance coverage) to justify blocking Person A’s insurance.

7. The Judge further orders daycare expenses to be divided “Pro-rata”, now placing Person A on ongoing child support.

8. On the morning of the April 27, 2023 hearing, Person A updates and files the financial affidavits to reflect the denial of Medical credits just made two days prior and presents them as evidence at trial.

9. At the April 27, 2023 hearing, the Judge denies the updated affidavits.

10. The Judge then solely uses Person B’s AGI from a tax return, artificially lowering Person B’s reported income.

11. Person A files a motion for rehearing citing clear statutory violations, which was ultimately denied without a hearing.

89. No reasonable observer would conclude that Person A received fair proceedings and due process. These procedural irregularities, unexpected reasoning, collectively disadvantaged Person A, raising serious concerns about the outcome’s reliability and violating the due process clause of the Florida Constitution, Article I, Section 9, which states that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

COURTS MUST NOT TIP THE SCALES EVEN IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES

90. At the time of the August 8, 2023 order, both the Petitioner and Respondent(Mother) were █████, had no criminal history or record of child abuse, and neither were a public figure. The sole discernible distinction was that the Petitioner is male, while the Respondent(Mother) is female.

91. In Bell v. Bell, 587 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the trial court’s disproportionate division of marital assets was reversed because it was improperly based on the husband’s serious misconduct rather than any proven dissipation of marital assets or assumption of liability by the wife.

92. Despite the husband’s heinous conviction, an unquestionably extreme circumstance, the appellate court underscored that courts must adhere to equitable principles and statutory guidelines, prohibiting “tipping the scales” to punish a party.

93. Here, Judge Susan Stacy had no extreme factors that would warrant such a punitive adjudication to skew, and manipulate the child support determination.

94. Unlike in Bell, where the court's reasoning was influenced by an extreme factor, the disparity here was driven solely by gender bias. This contravenes the principles of fairness and equity emphasized in Bell and undermines the statutory guidelines designed to ensure impartial determinations.

LACK OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDY

95.On April 22, 2024, after the trial court summarily denied the petitioner’s motion for a rehearing (App 284-288), an appeal was assigned to a panel comprising Chief Judge James A. Edwards, Judge Adrian G. Soud, and Judge Joseph Boatwright of the Fifth District Court of Florida.

96. Despite significant statutory and constitutional concerns, including the absence of a required child support worksheet as mandated by Florida law see R.M. v. R.C., 227 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) and Hogan v. Aloia, 257 So. 3d 479 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)), the appellate court issued a per curiam affirmance on August 6, 2024 without a written opinion. Subsequent motions for rehearing and clarification were also denied, and the nature of the per curiam decision precludes discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court see Wheeler v. State; Wells v. State; Gandy v. State.

97.The record, even without the transcript from the April 25, 2023 hearing, clearly demonstrates that the trial court improperly reversed the correct child support calculation by denying the petitioner a credit for his medical insurance payments.

98.This error is compounded by the fact that the mother had no commercial insurance (App 318), a detail which underscores the trial court’s deliberate action to block the petitioner’s rightful credits. As established in Silverman v. Silverman, 940 So. 2d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) and Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So. 2d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), reversible errors evident on the face of the judgment are reviewable even in the absence of a transcript, with Casella v. Casella, 569 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) further supporting that such errors should mandate reversal.

99.Moreover, the absence of a properly filed Child Support Guidelines Worksheet deprived the appellate court of a critical tool for assessing the trial court’s calculation. Had the worksheet been included, it would have confirmed that the petitioner was entitled to medical insurance credits under Fla. Stat. § 61.30(8), thereby exposing a substantial statutory violation that effectively shielded the mother from responsibility.

100.                    Given these clear, on-the-face reversible errors and the appellate court’s failure to address the omission or clarify its reasoning, the petitioner is left with no alternative remedy in Florida. The repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain reconsideration, coupled with a per curiam affirmance that lacks procedural value (see Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 5th Dist., 434 So.2d 310, 311 (Fla. 1983)), render this petition for a writ of mandamus the petitioner’s only available recourse.

CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

101.                    The Petitioner's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “No person shall be… deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s corresponding guarantee have been violated. The Court’s exclusion of the Petitioner's updated financial affidavits, which were critical to accurately reflecting his entitlement to medical insurance credits, deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to be heard in a proceeding that directly affects his property interests.

102.                    Furthermore, the unanticipated alteration of the established cost allocation, shifting from the Petitioner's agreed 100% responsibility for daycare expenses to an imposed pro-rata split without proper notice, constitutes an additional violation of his procedural due process rights. This arbitrary reallocation, denial of statutory granted Medical insurance credits, coupled with the refusal to consider vital evidence, undermines the requirement for an impartial tribunal and the meaningful participation of the Petitioner in the adjudicative process as mandated by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

THE LAW OF THE CASE

103.                    Because the prior appeal resulted in a Per Curiam Affirmance (PCA) with no opinion or citation, the “law of the case” doctrine does not bar reconsideration of the legal issues, as it applies only to matters “actually considered and decided in a former appeal.” Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001).

104.                    Moreover, even if the doctrine were applicable, reconsideration is warranted where adherence to the prior ruling would result in manifest injustice: “Only where strict adherence to a point of law previously decided in a former appeal would result in ‘manifest injustice’ will an appellate court reconsider and correct it.” Jordan v. State, 285 So. 3d 267, 277-78 (Fla. 2019) (citing Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 106).

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA

105.                    The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata are not absolute instruments to preclude relief when their rigid application would undermine the ends of justice. As the Florida Supreme Court recognized in State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287 (Fla. 2003), “res judicata will not be invoked where it would defeat the ends of justice. See deCancino v. E. Airlines, Inc., 283 So.2d 97, 98; Universal Constr. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 68 So.2d 366, 369,” and “we hold that collateral estoppel will not be invoked to bar relief where its application would result in a manifest injustice.” This clear acknowledgment that rigid application of these doctrines may produce inequitable outcomes demands that their invocation here be scrutinized under the manifest injustice exception.

106.                    Moreover, recent jurisprudence reinforces that collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine not to be applied when it leads to pernicious results. See Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Trinidad, 358 So.3d 754, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) ("[C]ollateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, and is not to be invoked where it will lead to pernicious results or where its application will result in a manifest injustice" (alteration in original) (quoting 32A Fla. Jur. 2d Judgments & Decrees § 111 (2022 ed.)). Florida courts have long embraced this flexible approach, as underscored in Cook v. State, 921 So.2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), and further affirmed by Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Company, Inc., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971) ("neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata is rigidly applied when their application would result in manifest injustice"). Accordingly, invoking these doctrines in the instant matter would produce manifest injustice, thereby mandating that they not be applied to bar the relief sought.

PUBLICINTEREST

107.                    This case extends beyond the parties and jeopardizes public confidence in Florida’s family-law framework. A Florida Judge has placed a Father on ongoing child support solely based on his gender.

108.                    Despite clear evidence and procedure that the Petitioner already provided the child’s primary expenses, Judge Susan Stacy voluntarily placed him on ongoing child support and inflated his arrears. Such an unwarranted move discourages fathers who take on key caregiving roles and sends the message that they will be forced onto child support, and arrears inflated regardless of the facts solely because of their gender.

109.                    Court intervention is crucial to protect the integrity of the judicial process and restore justice. Mandamus relief would confirm that statutory mandates are not optional and that parents who shoulder their children’s financial needs will not be unjustly penalized regardless of gender. This action reinforces public trust in an unbiased judiciary and ensures parental responsibilities are honored based on evidence, not presumption or gender.

CONCLUSION

110.                    As factually proven in this Petition, Judge Susan Stacy has intentionally and consciously, irrespective of any proven motives, placed a Father(a male) on ongoing child support when it is clearly established under Florida statutes that the Mother(a female) should be responsible.

111.                    Even if this Court were to allow Judge Stacy to order the daycare expenses to be divided (pro rata), the Petitioner would still not be subject to ongoing child support provided his rights to medical insurance credits are not denied.

112.                    This is plainly and clearly illustrated in (App. 319–322), which employs the exact figures from the current ongoing child support worksheet (App. 315–318) currently used to enforce child support while granting the father’s medical insurance credits.

113.                    Accordingly, both deviations, the denial of medical credits and the pro rata share of daycare, were implemented by Judge Susan Stacy as necessary measures to keep the Mother off ongoing child support.

114.                    This fact underscores the continuing denial of the petitioner’s statutory rights and the wrongful and unlawful taking of his property combined with the inflated arrears which both benefit the Respondent(mother).

115.                    Furthermore, Judge Susan Stacy provided no competent or substantial evidence or reasoning to justify these drastic changes in the final order, a requirement for any judgment imposing such significant modifications.

116.                    The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Kendrick v. Everheart, 390 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1980), established that denying a father the right to initiate a paternity action constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of statutory rights and exposes an inherent gender bias in Florida’s laws. Although current statutes permit a father to file a petition, the enduring legacy of such gender bias remains evident after more than 40 years.

117.                    Denying this writ would not only perpetuate manifest injustice but would also enable Judges to impose child support obligations on Fathers contrary to Florida’s own statutes solely based on their gender, thereby echoing the very gender bias Kendrick was designed to eradicate.

REFLIEF SOUGHT

WHEREFORE, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this Honorable Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Honorable Mark E. Herr to:

1.     Vacate the August 8, 2023 Partial Final Judgment on Child Support order.

2.     Set a new trial to Recalculate child support obligations in full compliance with Florida Statutes, ensuring all prepaid health insurance credits and financial affidavits are properly considered.

3.     File and include all Child Support Guidelines Worksheets properly.

4.     Grant such further relief as this Court deems just and proper to ensure adherence to the clear statutory mandates and restore confidence in the judicial process.

Respectfully submitted on this 13th day of February 2025,